







Pregledni znanstveni rad 
UDK: 340.115 Kelsen, H. 
340.132.6 Kelsen, H. 
Rad primljen: 15. veljače 2021. 
Rad prihvaćen: 10. svibnja 2021. 
 
Summary 
This thesis deals with Hans Kelsen’s concept of peripheral imputation, a 
relation established by law between material facts as legal conditions and 
consequences.  Being a fundamental concept of his idea of legal science, 
this paper describes how Kelsen draws the comparison between 
imputation and causation, a fundamental principle of natural science that 
also connects material facts, albeit differently. In addition to the 
comparison itself, the paper discusses how Kelsen uses it to work in favor 
of legal science. Firstly, the difference between the two relations is used 
by Kelsen to justify the autonomy of legal science. After all, if it makes 
sense to talk about a way of relating things in the world that’s not 
causation, it makes sense to have a science that describes things as they’re 
related in this other way. Secondly, pointing to the analogies between the 
two relations, and consequently between legal and natural science, is 
supposed to prop up the legitimacy of former. For Kelsen, causal relations 
take the form of statements of scientific laws, so exploring this second move 
requires us to answer what makes scientific laws important in scientific 
explanation and whether this can be mimicked by imputation. The answer 
if far from obvious, but it’s tentatively proposed that Kelsen could make 
use of the idea of nomic necessity of scientific laws, as Kelsen has no 
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trouble describing both relations as necessary in his early works. As this 
changes in his later works, the question arises whether Kelsen’s whole 
manoeuvre falls apart.  
Keywords: Kelsen, imputation, legal science, causation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen was one of the leading figures in the 
field during the 20th century. Born in Prague in 1881 and passed away in 
1973, Kelsen’s career spanned over half a century, resulting in work which 
remains an important source of discussion, controversy and inspiration.  
The sheer volume of his academic output and different philosophical 
traditions influencing his work make it a difficult task to arrive to a neat 
and simple periodization of his long career.1 Nonetheless, I believe that 
having a rough sketch of his intellectual development will prove useful, so 
this is precisely what we get to now.  
Generally, Kelsen’s career overlapped with the birth of modern analytic 
philosophy and a shift from German idealist tradition to the empiricist 
movement that remained dominant in Anglo-American philosophy to this 
day. Consequently, Kelsen’s philosophical influences are best described as 
interplay of neo-Kantianism and empiricism.2 As I hope will become clear, 
drawing a firm division in time between the two influences is a difficult 
task. Still, it’s somewhat clear that the former is dominant in his work 
during the first part of his career, up to 1960-ies. This include most of the 
works cited in this thesis, namely both the first and second edition of the 
Pure Theory of Law3, then his sociological work in causation, the book 
Retribution and Causality 4  and finally his essay Causality and 
 
1 The topic was, at one point, an object of fierce debate. See Paulson, S. L., Arriving at a 
Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999, pp. 351-364. 
2  Important facets of these traditions and their influence on Kelsen's work will be 
explained. 
3 Kelsen, H., Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, A Translation of the First 
Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1997; Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law, The Lawbook Exchange, New Jersey, 2005. 
4 Kelsen, H., Retribucija i kauzalnost, Naklada Breza, Zagreb, 2013.  
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Imputation5. Empiricism looms large in Kelsen’s work from the start, and 
as Neo-Kantian influence wavers gradually during the 40-ies and 50-ies, 
Kelsen’s work enters the second phase, characterised by scepticism about 
Neo-Kantianism and greater endorsement of empiricism. This 
development culminates in his posthumous book the General Theory of 
Norms.6 One thing is worth bearing in mind. The fact that I mention these 
general philosophical trends suggests that I hold them to be important for 
understanding Kelsen. That much is true, but it’s also true that Kelsen’s 
own treatment of these influences was described, not without reason, as 
superficial.7 I think this will become clear, as a good part of this paper is 
dedicated to explaining how these influences are reflected in Kelsen’s 
work, especially its main topic.  
It’s hard to overstate the importance and originality of Kelsen’s ideas. 
Among them, the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen’s version of legal science, 
is arguably the best known. Pure Theory of Law is Kelsen’s attempt to 
create an autonomous discipline of legal science, one separate from both 
empirical and natural law approaches to law.  
The main subject of this work is the cornerstone of the Pure Theory of 
Law, namely the doctrine of imputation. Let me tentatively define it as a 
proposition that there exist a special kind of relation (imputation) between 
the conditions of a hypothetically formulated legal norm and its legal 
consequences. This relation is expressed by propositions of legal science 
in the form of “If a, then it ought to be b”, where a and b are (sets of) 
material facts or events, and “ought” marks this connection.8  
I will aim to elucidate this concept, especially its two features. Firstly, the 
role it has in justifying the need for legal science as a discipline separate 
 
5 Kelsen, H., Causality and imputation, Ethics Vol. 61, No. 1, 1950, pp. 1-11. 
6 Kelsen, H., General Theory of Norms, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991. 
7  Zalewska, M., Causality and Imputation (Kelsen), in Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds), 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Springer, Dordrecht, 
2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_220-1, p. 3. 
8  It's important to note that „ought“ does not necessarily express an obligation for 
someone to do something, so the propositions mustn’t be understood as “if some events 
happen, subject x is to do something“. The meaning of „ought“ is a complicated topic in 
Kelsen studies and one I will mostly try to evade, so it suffices to say for now that it is to 
be understood in a very limited way, simply marking that there's a legal relation of two 
material facts, or events. Kelsen’s short summary of everything encompassed by “ought” 
can be found in the second edition of Pure Theory. Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 5. 
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from natural sciences and secondly, its similarities and differences with 
causation.  
Due to reasons of space, I ignore one important feature of Kelsen’s work. 
There’s a well understood ambiguity in Kelsen’s work regarding the term 
“imputation”. Tentative definition stated above describes what Kelsen 
himself dubs the “peripheral” imputation, as opposed to that of “central” 
kind. Given that the goal of this work is the elucidation of peripheral 
imputation, this introduction briefly deals with the central type, after which 
the qualification of “peripheral” is dropped when using the term.  
Kelsen builds the idea of central imputation on the traditional Kantian 
doctrine of imputation. Kant writes:  
“Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is judgement whereby someone 
is deemed the author (causa libera) [free cause] of an event, which 
thereupon is called a deed (factum) and is subject to laws.”9  
Therefore, traditional view of imputation casts it as a relation between a 
person and an act ascribed to the person. Kelsen importantly parts way 
with the tradition by using the term “central imputation” to designate 
ascribing to some person, namely legal entity or an organ of an entity, acts 
committed by another person. In other words, it’s a relation that ascribes 
acts to a fictionalized entity.10  
In the first edition of his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen explicitly 
distinguishes it from peripheral imputation, describing it as “an entirely 
different operation from the aforementioned peripheral imputation, which 
connects a material fact [...] to another material fact within the system.”11 
Regarding the relation of central and peripheral imputation, Stanley 
Paulson notes the following: 
 
9 Kant, I., Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, as cited in Paulson, S. L., A 'justified 
normativity' thesis in Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law? : rejoinders to Robert Alexy and 
Joseph Raz, in Klatt, M. (ed.), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert 
Alexy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 103. 
10 In this way, by connecting acts of organs and legal systems, whether comprehensive or 
subsystems, are material facts related to the unity of a system. Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, §25(d), 
p. 50. 
11 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 51. 
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 “If Kelsen's doctrine of central imputation in Main Problems (1911) 
differs from the traditional doctrine in manifesting no personalized subject, 
his doctrine of peripheral imputation, which he introduces a decade later, 
differs from both versions of the doctrine of central imputation in having, 
stricto sensu, no subject of attribution at all.”12 
What is ignored in this work is the evolving nature of Kelsen’s view 
regarding central imputation. The distinction between central and 
peripheral imputation is not found in his very early works. Moreover, 
central imputation designates a special kind of relation, so the role of 
justifying the need for an autonomous legal science, later ascribed to 
peripheral imputation, was first ascribed to central imputation.13  
At this point, just a common sense view of causation will suffice. Events 
or goings-on are caused by one another, physically linked together in some 
way such that if one event hadn’t happened, the other would not either. 
Describing how and what is causally linked together is arguably one of the 
main tasks of scientific research and explanation. The question now is 
whether there is a different but analogous relation to causation, the 
existence of which would, in some yet to be specified way, justify that we 
also have a different sort of science. This science would not be interested 
in what is caused by what, but what is imputed to what. This is the sketch 
of the Kelsenian project in legal science, one we investigate more 
thoroughly throughout this work. 
This work has the following structure. Section 2 focuses on the interplay 
of empirical and legal science as we take a closer look into Kelsen’s overall 
project, namely justifying the independence of legal science. In the end, 
Kelsen notes the differences and similarities between imputation and 
 
12 Paulson, op.cit. in 9, p. 106. 
13 A good historical overview of this development is presented in Zalewska, op. cit. in 7. 
As Paulson notes, despite the terminology, Kelsen himself considered peripheral 
imputation to be of the more fundamental kind. See Paulson, S. L., Hans Kelsen’s 
Doctrine of Imputation, Ratio Juris, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2001, p. 48. 
In an interesting article, Langford and Bryan engage with Kelsen’s 1926 Lecture Course 
where the concept of normative imputation is used to argue for a monist theory of 
international law and against the primacy of national law. Moreover, they present the 
change in Kelsen’s views on imputation between 1926 and Introduction to the Problems 
of Legal Theory as an internal development of Kelsen’s views, rather than his divergence 
from Kant. See Langford, P., Bryan, I., Hans Kelsen's Concept of Normative Imputation, 
Ratio Juris, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2013, pp. 85-110. 
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causation mainly as a part of an argument in this project. After sketching 
the importance of the distinction between the two relations, section 3 
zooms in on the comparison itself, but also aims to explain how it’s made 
to work in favour of legal science. 
 
2. LEGAL SCIENCE AND CAUSAL SCIENCE  
For Kelsen, nature is an order of things related by the principle of causality. 
Consequently, causal science describes nature as it is ordered in this way, 
by statements of laws of nature expressing the various causal relations.14 
It’s worth noting that, by causal sciences, Kelsen has in mind not only the 
usual candidates like physics and chemistry, but also psychology, 
sociology and history, as they all aim to describe their object in virtue of 
causal relations between certain causes and effects in the relevant subject 
area. 15  One question might naturally arise. Why couldn’t law also be 
described by one of these disciplines, and why is there any need for a 
special legal science?16 Now, the question isn’t should law be a subject of 
inquiry for psychology or sociology. Kelsen’s answer to that question is 
clearly affirmative.17  It’s fully obvious that all these disciplines might 
provide interesting insight into workings of legal systems or their societal 
roles. The question, on the other hand, is whether legal science as dogmatic 
 
14 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 75. Kelsen links the ideas of scientific explanation, causal 
relations and statements of scientific laws. This idea is further explored in section 3. 
15 He divides sciences into natural and social, depending on what's the object of their 
inquiry, and the latter are further divided into causal and normative. All the mentioned 
natural and social sciences are described as? causal, while a normative social science 
would be legal science.  
16  Generally, most (empirical) scientific disciplines face the questions about the 
possibility of their reduction. This is a perennial theme in philosophy of science, so let 
me sketch a definition. Reduction of one theory to another involves full representation of 
statements of the former theory in terms of the latter. What is thus achieved is that 
“distinctive traits of a given subject matter are allegedly explained by, and in some sense 
reduced to, more inclusive […] traits not distinctive to that subject matter.” The hope is 
that this manoeuvre marks a scientific progress either by realizing that something which 
was previously unclear is “nothing but” something that is clearer, or that by reduction, we 
achieve more theoretical simplicity by placing explanatory power on fewer theoretical 
terms or entities of some other kind. See Nagel, E., Issues in the Logic of Reductive 
Explanations, in Curd, M., Cover, J. (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 
Norton, 1998, pp. 905-906. 
17 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, pp. 13-14. 
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jurisprudence can be fully replaced by them. And, to put it very simply, for 
this to happen it is required that all there is to be known or can be known 
about law, can be known by the methods of these disciplines. 
It’s worth here to give some contours to what and how exactly presents the 
danger to the autonomy of legal science.18 The main culprits in this regard 
were psychologism and sociology of law. Psychologism presents an 
important intellectual movement in general intellectual and legal thought 
of late 19th and early 20th century and it can briefly be characterised as a 
doctrine that everything19 is psychological or expressible in such states.20 
When it comes to law, such a doctrine implies that legal concepts, e.g. 
norms, obligations, etc. are ultimately a matter of our psychology.21 The 
story is similar when it comes to sociology of law, which examines how 
certain causes influence the creation, application of and obedience to law 
 
18 The work mostly focuses on other sciences. It's well known that Kelsen viewed theories 
of natural law as posing danger to the „purity“ of legal science as well. 
19  This „everything“ usually means a domain of interest to a certain discipline. E.g. 
psychologism in logic claims that laws of logic are ultimately reducible to, or in some 
other way just a matter of our psychological states.  
20  This short description of psychologism and its relationship with Kelsen's work is 
adopted from Stalney L. Paulson. See Paulson, op. cit. in 3, pp. 93-102. 
21 So, to be bound by a norm is just to have a certain psychological attitude towards some 
facts. One of Kelsen’s targets is psychologism found in works of Georg Jellinek. When 
talking about the normative significance of certain material facts, Jellinek thus describes 
„the normative force of the factual“:  
„[…] its normative import lies in the underived quality of our nature, on the strength of 
which something accustomed is physiologically and psychologically easier to reproduce 
than something new.“  
Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, cited in Paulson, S. L., ibid., p. 101.  
Recently, Matthias Klatt offered a more sympathetic interpretation of Jellinek. Klatt 
argues that Jellinek understands validity as (psychological) efficacy of law. Thus what 
Jellinek understands by “normative” is the capability of law to motivate, an obviously 
psychological disposition. Jellinek’s “normative power of the factual” is really just 
“regarded-as-normative power of the factual. This sense of validity clearly cuts no ice 
with the usual understanding, consequently making Kelsen’s accusations of Is-Ought 
fallacy misguided. Two points are worth mentioning here. Firstly, if indeed, this is all 
there is to Jellinek’s theory, it’s harmless to the normative theory of law as it doesn’t truly 
aim to replace it. Secondly, whether Kelsen is right about attributing harmful 
psychologism to Jellinek is incidental for our present purposes, interesting as it may be. 
The fact remains that Kelsen thought of Jellinek as holding such views and presented his 
theory in part as an opposition to Jellinek’s. See Klatt, M., Law As Fact and Norm: Georg 
Jellinek and the Dual Nature of Law, in Bezemek, C., Ladavac, N., Schauer, F. (eds.), 
The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between Is and Ought, Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2019, pp. 45-64.  
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in a given society. Consequently, familiar “normative sounding” concepts 
are to be eliminated or explained in more congenial terms.22 Both of these 
approaches to law have ultimately the same upshot: causal explanations of 
law suffice.  
Kelsen’ response to these methodological claims is rather straightforward. 
There’s more to law than causal relations of material facts, as law’s 
normative meaning is not a matter of any one person’s psychological states 
or something to be explained in any similar statements about material facts. 
Kelsen aims to establish this by invoking the special “oughtness” of law, 
that is, normative meaning law provides when it renders material facts 
legally relevant. This normative meaning is not argued for by any 
sophisticated argument in Kelsen’s work, nor Kelsen think there is much 
need for this. The “oughtness” of law is simply what is grasped when one 
fully understands the meaning of legally relevant facts or events, e.g. the 
meaning of a group of people raising their hand is only grasped if we 
understand that it represents passing a new law. Kelsen calls this the 
“objective” sense to accentuate that its meaning does not depend on 
subjective meanings ascribed to the fact by individuals.23 The objective 
sense of law is readily apparent in our descriptions of law24 as well as the 
fact that legal science, in form of dogmatic jurisprudence has existed for 
millennia.25 As Kelsen puts it: 
“[…] if all meaning is denied to the “ought” – then it would be senseless 
to say: “this is legally permitted, that is forbidden”. […] The thousands of 
statements in which the law is expressed daily would be senseless. In 
contrast to this, the fact is undeniable that everybody understands readily 
that it is one thing to say: “A is legally obligated to pay $1000 to B.” and 
quite another “There is a certain chance that A will pay $1000 to B.”26  
 
22 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 32-33. and in 3, pp. 100-103. 
23 Kelsen, H., op. cit. in 3, pp. 8-10. It’s a famous part of Kelsen’s work that this meaning 
is objective because it’s an object of a valid legal norm, the validity of which ultimately 
rests on it’s creation being authorized by the presupposed Basic Norm.  
24 Kelsen presents this argument in Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, but he 
puts it very explicitly in Pure Theory of Law in this way: „If we analyze our statements 
about human behaviour […] we discover that we connect acts of human behaviour toward 
each other and toward other acts […] also according to a principle different from 
causality.“ See Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 33 and in 3, p. 76. 
25 Kelsen raises this point in op. cit. in 3, p. 105. 
26 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 33 
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To this, one might add that it’s one thing to say that someone wishes 
someone else to do something, and a different thing to say that someone 
legally ought to do something.  
 The upshot, aside from there even being legal norms and legal meaning in 
addition to material facts, is that there is a gap between the two. 27 
Consequently, making any explanation of law which refers to material 
facts only is simply a non-starter. George Pavlakos sums it up:  
“[…]it is logically possible that we can know all the relevant facts without 
knowing that the relevant legal norm obtains. The ensuing explanatory gap 
is modelled by Kelsen as an Is-Ought gap, whereby it is impossible to 
derive an Ought-fact (legal norm) from any given set of Is-facts (lower-
level facts).”28 
So, Kelsen hopes to have, prima facie at least, established that in addition 
to causation, there is another way of thinking about material facts and how 
they can be connected – they can be imputed to one another in virtue of 
legal norms.29 As Kelsen takes it, describing this relationship requires a 
special, normative kind of science. 
 At this point, legal science comes in, as it aims at cognition of legal norms, 
qua legal norms. In doing so, legal science describes legal norms by 
 
27  From a general philosophical perspective it's perhaps worth pointing out that this 
commits Kelsen to some sort of ontological realism concerning abstracta, that is, non-
spatiotemporal entities. Kelsen himself is clear about this point, explicitly describing 
norms as outside of space and time. See Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 12. 
Given that it is somewhat of a default view that abstracta are causally inert, it follows that 
inquiry into them cannot be a matter of describing causal relations they enter into. For the 
sake of some broader themes we get into in this work, it’s worth noting that empiricism 
is characterised by a thoroughgoing distrust of positing abstract entities. Arguments for 
this distrust vary, but we might point out scepticism about the possibility of humans as 
beings firmly situated in time and space to have epistemic access to something outside it 
and claiming that abstracta are explanatorily vacuous.  
28  Pavlakos, G., Kelsenian imputation and the explanation of legal norms, Revus 
[Online], 37 | 2019, Online since 22 November 2018, accessed on 2nd of October, 2020., 
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/4808; DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.4808. 
29  I say prima facie because there's a bit more to this story. Kelsen hopes to have 
established that there are legal norms and that we can have knowledge of them. 
Establishing that there is imputation requires another step, one explained in more detail 
in the section about the nature of imputation. 
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propositions of law, statements about norms.30 Crucially, these statements 
take the form of hypothetical propositions, “If a, then it ought to be b”, 
which express a specific kind of connection established between a and b 
by the legal norm. When lawyers describe positive law, they take 
themselves to be describing how a certain legal condition is legally related 
to a certain legal consequence. Of course, whether this connection between 
the two events will, as a matter of fact, causally obtain is clearly a separate 
matter, one that might or might not be of interest to a lawyer.31 This relates 
to an important difference between the two relations. It’s a feature of 
imputation that it is brought about by fiat of legal authority, or as Kelsen 
puts it, “by a legal norm created by an act of will” or “established by acts 
of human or superhuman beings”.32 Contrary to this, causality is free from 
such human intervention. This in turn has the consequence that statements 
of natural laws are falsifiable; they’re a matter of nature so they can be 
contrary to it, and if they are, natural science revises them. Violation of a 
norm, on the other hand, is in itself no reason to regard it as invalid and 
consequently, propositions of law aren’t revised because they contradict 
reality.33 This, of course, is not to say they never change, as norms can 
change the same way they were created, by fiat of a legal authority. 
In this section we already mentioned some differences between the two, 
mostly to see how these motivate the existence of legal science. For the 
sake of avoiding repetition, these won’t be mentioned again as the precise 
nature of imputation and its differences as well as similarities to causation 




30 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 71. 
Kelsen dubs these as „rules of law“. Following M. Hartney, I shall dub them „propositions 
of law“. See Michael Hartney's Translator's note in Kelsen, op. cit. in 6, p. xxxiii. 
31 Moreover, that the legal relationship exists while the actual relationship might not 
obtain, points to the necessity of describing the legal rules with “ought” statements. 
Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 88.  
32 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 77 and in 5, p. 6. I mention just in passing that in Introduction 
to the Problems of Legal Theory, imputation is a distinctly legal relation and Kelsen does 
not extend it to analysis of moral statements, which are considered to have imperative 
structure. This changes in his later works.  
33 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 88 and in 6, p. 37. 
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3. IMPUTATION AND CAUSATION  
3.1. General nature of imputation and causation  
In what follows, we go back to those general philosophical traditions and 
see how they have influenced Kelsen’s understanding of causation and 
imputation. Kelsen’s own statements of those relations, mostly from his 
earlier phase, are also presented here in 3.1. We continue with these early 
views in 3.2, this time in more detail and with a lot of focus on how it all 
plays a part in his overall goal.34 These two sections form our backdrop as 
we continue to the following one, where we focus on what has changed in 
Kelsen’s views. As we will see, some important features are retained, but 
what is changed is significant.  
Causation itself is a perennial topic in philosophy and any serious inquiry 
into it far exceeds the scope of this work. One caveat is worth bearing in 
mind. Modern work on causation mostly focuses on particular instances of 
it, e.g. breaking of a window by Annie’s throwing of a rock. As it will soon 
become clear, this is not what Kelsen usually had in mind when talking 
about causation, as he placed more focus on law-like formulations of 
causal links.35 All in all, very explicit definitions of causation are hard to 
find in Kelsen’s work. The notion is mostly defined by examples and 
pointing out its particular features. So before we head into that, there’s no 
harm in sticking to where we left this topic in the last section, namely that 
Kelsen views causation as a specific principle which connects elements in 
nature.36  
Traditionally, causation was seen as special kind of connection between 
things in the world, sometimes even dubbed the “cement of the universe”, 
holding everything together in some special way. Subsequent empiricist 
tradition has generated a lot of scepticism about such a notion. Famously 
starting with Hume, the general empiricist thrust against causation is that 
our senses only perceive sequences of events, e.g. throwing of the rock, 
followed by the breaking of a window, without any deep metaphysical 
 
34 Admittedly, some of his later works are referenced in this part, but only where his 
position did not change and later quotes present a clearer expression of the idea. 
35 This is symptomatic of empiricist views of causation. More on this in the section 
discussing the structure of the two relationships.  
36 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 75. 
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connection or force underlying those sequences.37 Given that empiricists 
hold all genuine knowledge is in some way ultimately justified by senses, 
the project then becomes recasting the idea of causation in less 
metaphysically suspicious terms.  
I’m breaking no philosophical news in saying that Kant, another important 
influence to Kelsen, felt the force of these concerns. His response was 
accepting that causation isn’t a matter of our experience, but that it 
nevertheless exists as an apriori, non-experiential, principle of our 
thinking. Kant establishes this by transcendental arguments, those 
concerned with the very possibility of knowing objects, before we even 
experience them. The argument proceeds by starting from something 
which is “given”, namely, our experience and deducing something which 
is necessary for the given. This something are Kant’s apriori categories 
without which we could not have experience.38 The general form of this 
kind of argument is thus:39  
(1) P (given). 
(2) P is possible only if Q (transcendental premise). 
(3) Therefore, Q (transcendental conclusion). 
Important for our present purpose is that causation is one of those 
categories. That is, causation is a synthetic apriori principle of thinking 
 
37 Alexander Rosenberg, in a somewhat different context, puts it nicely: “Nothing, so to 
speak, hopped off of the first set of molecules and landed on the second set; the first set 
of molecules didn’t have a set of hands that reached out and pushed the second set of 
molecules. […] at a deeper level, say the level of atoms, or the quarks and electrons that 
make up the atoms, we will still only see a sequence of events, one following the other, 
only this time the events are sub-atomic. In fact, the outer shell electrons of the molecules 
on the surface of the first ball don’t even make contact with the electrons on the outer 
shells of the molecules at the nearest surface of the second ball. […] No matter how far 
down we go in the details, there does not appear to be any glue or cement that holds causes 
and effects together that we can detect or even imagine. Rosenberg, A., Philosophy of 
Science: A Contemporary Introduction, Third Edition, Routledge, New York, 2012., pp. 
66-67. 
38 Rohlf, M., "Immanuel Kant", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>. Accessed on 9th of October, 
2020. 
39 Paulson, op. cit. in 9, p. 75. 
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and empirical, causal laws of nature count as necessary for Kant in virtue 
of being “particular determinations” of this principle. 
Before seeing how this strategy is mimicked by Kelsen when it comes to 
imputation, let’s give the term some more contours.  
Perhaps the clearest Kelsen’s definition of imputation is found in his Pure 
Theory of Law. Thus Kelsen writes:  
“…legal norm in not understood… as an imperative, but a hypothetical 
proposition expressing a specific link between a conditioning material fact 
and a conditioned consequence.”40 
In the same section, he adds: 
“The relationship of sanction to a delict […] has only normative meaning. 
Ought is the expression of that relationship, termed “imputation”, and thus 
the expression of specific existence of law, […], representing the 
characteristic sense positing the reciprocal relation between material facts 
belonging to the legal system.41 
And the general formulation of a proposition of law is: “Under the 
conditions determined by the legal order, a coercive act ought to take 
place”.42  That is, Kelsen understands the reconstructed legal norms as 
having the form of “If A, then B ought to be”, where “ought” designates 
“a specific sense in which the legal condition and consequence belong 
together in a legal proposition”.43 
 
40 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 23.  
41 Ibidem.  
42 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 76. 
43 Ibid., p. 28. A point of clarification is in place here. As mentioned, legal science deals 
with descriptive statements about the law, aiming to offer reconstructions of norms 
created by the legal authority. That is, its statements are truth apt and descriptive, not 
prescriptive, as they’re about norms, but not themselves norms. In the quoted paragraphs, 
Kelsen uses the term “legal norm” and “imputation” somewhat interchangeably, even 
though imputation is the relationship expressed by sentences of legal science, not norms 
themselves. As his usage of the term “legal propositions” for expressions containing the 
“ought” suggests, Kelsen had this idea mind even in the first edition of The Pure Theory 
of Law, albeit only becoming explicit about this point in his later works. This was marked 
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No, let’s set the stage for Kelsen’s version of transcendental deduction.44 
Kelsen’s twist to the transcendental question is asking how law or legal 
science is possible. His answer starts with the given. In the last section we 
saw that Kelsen assumes that norms exist and that we have legal 
knowledge. This was the force of his arguments that we, with perfect sense, 
talk about norms and how they relate material facts as well as his 
contention that dogmatic jurisprudence has existed for millennia. So, (our 
knowledge of) norms is our given, taking the form of hypothetical 
judgements, that is, reconstructed legal norms which are the objects of the 
cognition in legal science. What is consequently derived is imputation as 
a principle of thinking without which cognition of norms is impossible. So, 
the argument is:45 
(1) These legal norms, together representing a legal system, are objectively 
valid. 
(2) The objective validity of these norms is possible only if the category of 
imputation is presupposed. 
(3) Therefore, the category of imputation is presupposed. 
 Putting all of this together, the following, by now familiar image emerges. 
There are two kinds of connections between things in the world, causation 
and imputation. The comparison of the two plays two important roles in 
Kelsen’s work. Firstly, the idea of causation is used to give us a clearer 
picture of imputation by noting their similarities and differences. 
Secondly, it’s a way to philosophically justify legal science. The role of 
their differences was already explained, but their similarities are arguably 
just as important, as it is a way for legal science to piggyback its way into 
respectability. As Stanley Paulson puts it:  
 
by the introduction of the already mentioned terminology, dubbing the objects of legal 
science “legal norms” and sentences of legal science “rules of law”.  
44 This part follows Paulson's brilliant exposition. Interestingly, Paulson's claim is that 
transcendental deduction fails to establish imputation as a necessary category of thought. 
See Paulson, S. L., The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1992, pp. 323. and 324. and op. cit. in 3, pp. 71-
78.  
45 Paulson, op. cit. in 3, p. 74. 
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“If it can be shown that aspects of the fundamental ordering principle of 
the natural sciences are reflected per analogiam in the fundamental 
ordering principle of legal science, then Kelsen's parallel will indeed 
enhance the status of legal science qua science.” 46 
The how and why of this piggybacking manoeuvre is never fully explained 
in Kelsen’s work, so one might wonder about the details. Exploring 
potential problems for Kelsen throws us headfirst into philosophy of 
science, so section 3.2 is dedicated to this topic as we analyse the 
substantive and structural aspects of the two, as they appear in Kelsen’s 
work.47 
 
3.2. The structure, relata and nature of causation and imputation 
Let’s start with Kelsen’s favourite, and very telling, example of causation: 
“If the metallic body is heated, it expands.”48 What becomes apparent from 
this example is the following. Firstly, what Kelsen mostly has in mind 
when discussing causation are actually scientific laws, hypothetical 
propositions expressing a general relationship of the form “If A, then (it 
must be) B”.49  Secondly, his concept of causation importantly echoes 
empiricism.  
As already mentioned, empiricist project in causation was aimed at 
recasting the idea using the more empirically palatable notions, e.g. 
sequences, facts, events and regularities. We can observe certain events 
followed by certain other events. But, certain events can follow other 
events without being causally related, so an empiricist must tell us what 
distinguishes any random accidental sequence of events from genuine 
causal relations. The answer is that, unlike accidental sequences, they are 
 
46 Paulson, op. cit. in 3, p. 107. 
47 I analyse the issues of the nature of a relation itself and the nature of its relata separately. 
This way of presenting the topic was inspired by Schaffer’s presentation of causation. See 
Schaffer, J., "The Metaphysics of Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), accessed on 4th of October, 2020. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/causation-metaphysics/>. 
48 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 90, in 5, p. 1, and 6, p. 22. 
49 In the second edition of PTL, Kelsen considers Laws of Nature to be applications of 
the principle of causation. Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 75. 
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instances of general laws, and general laws are just well confirmed 
universal regularities.50  
Kelsen’s views in all of his works seem to be influenced by this a great 
deal. Causation is a link between material facts, and it expresses “a 
functional connection” between them. 51  This is Kelsen’s rejection of 
causation as a deep, mysterious force of universe, and adoption of a very 
“low-key”, metaphysically unsuspicious version, something which he is 
explicit about.52 Importantly, this isn’t all there is to the story. In the first 
edition of Pure Theory of Law a step away from empiricist views is made 
when causation is described as “inviolable” – that is, necessary, something 
a lot of modern philosophers are sympathetic with.53 There’s a thought that 
 
50 Rosenberg puts this idea nicely: “On the empiricist view, causation consists in law-
governed sequence because there is no other observationally detectable property common 
and distinctive of all causal sequences besides exemplifying general laws. When we 
examine a single causal sequence—say one billiard ball hitting another. and the 
subsequent motion of the second ball, there is nothing to be seen that is not also present 
in a purely coincidental sequence, like a soccer goalkeeper’s wearing green gloves and 
her successfully blocking a shot. The difference between the billiard-ball sequence and 
the green goalie-glove sequence is that the former is an instance of an oft-repeated 
sequence, and the latter is not. […] All causal sequences share one thing in common that 
is missing in all merely coincidental sequences: they are instances of—they instantiate—
general laws.” Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, p. 43. 
It’s doubtful whether this really solves the problem, because it simply shifts the problem 
to providing an answer to what makes some universal regularities laws of nature as 
opposed to just regularities which are accidental. A trivial example might be the regularity 
of thunder sounds following the lightening, since there’s little doubt that one isn’t caused 
by the other. Cogency of an empiricist recasting of causation in terms of laws of nature 
heavily depends on whether we can distinguish laws of nature and just widespread, but 
accidental generalizations. It’s far from clear that this can be done without invoking some 
metaphysically extravagant notions of necessity. More is said on this later in the text. 
51 He uses this phrasing in both his early works and his later ones. See Kelsen, op. cit. in 
3, p. 24 and in 4, p. 360.  
52 And Kelsen is very explicit about this point even in his earlier stages, rejecting the 
notion of causation as a “magical force”. Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 24. Following Godfrey-
Smith, I use an informal term “low-key” to mean this rejection of metaphysically deep 
connection. Godfrey-Smith, P. Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of 
science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009, p. 191. 
53 One other interpretation of “inviolable” might be that laws of nature are non-statistical, 
something which he explicitly denies and goes at length to argue against in his later work, 
Retribution and Causality. I did not opt for this interpretation because in Kelsen’s earlier 
work, both relationships are described as “unbreakable” and it simply makes no sense do 
describe imputative relations as either statistical or non-statistical. See Kelsen, op. cit. in 
3, p. 25. 
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laws of nature have what is called “nomic” necessity to them, different and 
weaker from the familiar logical necessity. Although laws of nature 
generally aren’t thought to be a matter of logic, they don’t seem to be just 
generalizations of their particular instances, but link their relata in some 
deeper way. They express how things, in some way must be.54 Allow me 
to leave this issue precariously hanging in the air for now, with a promise 
to offer some motivations later in the text. 
Propositions of legal science are modelled closely after statements of 
scientific laws. Just like causation, they have a hypothetical structure of “If 
A, then B ought to be”. Just like with causation, I take Kelsen to insist on 
similar “low-keyness” of imputation as both statements about norms and 
about nature express a sort of “functional connection” between material 
facts. Accordingly, just like it is a mistake to think there’s anything deep 
to causation, it’s a mistake to think that the “ought” of imputation has some 
morally deep meaning.55 But again, in the same breath with causation, 
imputation is characterised as necessary. The characterisation of both 
relations as necessary represents Kantian influences on Kelsen’s early 
work, as the empiricists have, expectedly, been sceptical of any type of 
necessity that isn’t a matter of analytic entailment.56 After all, it’s hard to 
 
54 Nomic necessity and Kantian view of necessity should not be equated. More will be 
said on this later, but suffice to say for now that what this nomic necessity amounts to is 
a topic for debate. A common symptom of it is taken to be that statements of laws of 
nature, unlike just universal accidental generalizations, support the truth of counterfactual 
statements, e.g. “if the metallic body had not been heated up, it wouldn't have expanded”. 
Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, pp. 63-65. 
55 Kelsen, in his arguably still Kantian phase in the second edition of Pure Theory of Law, 
puts it this way: „Such fallacy [that the „ought“ has a moral meaning, author's comment] 
is present if indeed the legal „ought“ is interpreted to constitute an absolute value. But 
one cannot speak of [this] if the „ought“ in the law-describing rule of law merely has the 
meaning of a specific functional connection. […] Imputation, just like causation, is a 
principle of order in human thinking, and therefore just as much or just as little an illusion 
or ideology as causality, which – to use Hume's or Kant's words – is only a thinking habit 
or category of thinking.„ Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 103.  
So, as a matter of Kelsen exegesis, it's a mistake to ascribe to so called justified 
normativity thesis to actual Kelsen, irrespective of what „the philosophically most 
compelling or interesting“ aspects of his work is. This point is forcefully argued for by 
Paulson, op. cit. in 3. 
56 And what was previously said of genuine causal relations, namely that they support 
counterfactuals, arguably works for imputative relations as well, even though it’s hard to 
see what would be the equivalent of accidental generalizations in the sphere of imputation. 
Additionally, the formulation is rather quirky, e.g. “if the delict had not been committed, 
it is not the case that there ought to be a sanction.  
Pravnik : časopis za pravna i društvena pitanja, Vol. 55, br. 107, 2021. 
185 
 
make sense of a relation being both necessary and “low-key” if one doesn’t 
endorse Kantian conception of them as categories of thought. Whether this 
low-keyness and necessity of both relations works as a matter of their role 
in scientific explanation is something we turn our heads to now.  
Stanley Paulson, continuing on his earlier quote, pinpoints the importance 
of the analogy between causation and imputation for Kelsen’s overall 
project:  
“It is of utmost significance here that Kelsen wishes to highlight a 
necessary, nomological or law-like relation in the law running parallel to 
the necessary, nomological or law-like relation manifest in causality. 
Kelsen's development of this parallel is a central part of his effort to turn 
the legal science of his day into something scientifically respectable.”57 
To explore this, we enter into some difficult topics in philosophy of science 
and also a bit of speculation about Kelsen’s own views, but not 
extravagantly so.58 It’s clear that Kelsen thinks that scientific laws form an 
important part of science, and it’s clear that he thinks that whatever is it 
about them which makes science legitimate, can also be mimicked by 
imputation to make legal science legitimate. Again, formulating scientific 
laws seems part and parcel of most sciences which don’t have their status 
regularly doubted, so as a matter of rhetoric and persuasive strength, liking 
legal science to them makes perfect sense. But this isn’t what currently 
interests us as we want to see whether this makes sense philosophically.  
To answer this, we need to see what is it generally that makes scientific 
explanation explanatory, or justified. And there’s a consensus that it isn’t 
enough for science to tell us how things are, but also why are things the 
way they are. Intuitively, simply knowing that something happens when 
something else happens seems insufficient for genuine understanding.59 
 
57 Paulson, op. cit. in 3, p. 107. 
58 A lot of terminology and problems described in this paper was developed after Kelsen's 
early statements of his views, so it might be argued that what follows is more of a „rational 
reconstruction“ of his views.  
59  Modern philosophy places a lot of focus on explaining this idea of scientific 
explanation. The reader doesn’t need to feel bad if they feel suspicious about all of this, 
as they are in good company. A common feature of empiricism is a distrust of putting 
such extra goals for science, as they take science to simply be a system for predicting 
experiences. For an empiricist, the questions of “why?” go beyond this and ominously 
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With that in mind, we go into a very bad example of a theory of scientific 
explanation – the covering law model of explanation (hereinafter “CL”).  
This influential account, historically developed by empiricists of the 20th 
century, nicely connects scientific laws and scientific explanation. On this 
model, explanation is an objective, context-independent relation because 
to explain something is simply to show how it’s derived in an argument 
which uses laws of nature as one of its premises. I call it a bad example 
because it is a view of explanation on which there isn’t really much 
explanation going on. All scientific explanation can tell us is that, given 
that when some a happens, some b happens, and that a has happened, it 
was expected that b will happen as well. For this to be successful, 
conditions of scientific laws need to be formulated such that their 
occurrence guarantees the effect. This is what explanation amounts to – 
showing that you had good grounds to expect what had occurred, so on 
this view, explanation is prediction.60 Consequently, scientific laws are 
valuable because they show us causal relations or in some other way allow 
us to deduce knowledge of particular instances that we previously didn’t 
have or generate further testable hypotheses.61  
Regardless of whether one accepts this exact version of explanation, this 
account has a positive feature of pointing to an intimate relationship 
between providing an explanation, laws of nature and causation, 
something Kelsen might wish to draw on.62 Before saying more about why 
this idea might have appeal for Kelsen, let me go into some problems 
 
echo some purposive, spiritual interpretations of nature. Consequently, their view of 
scientific explanation is extremely narrow.  
On this note, it’s very likely that Kelsen would, echoing the empiricists, also just deny 
this extra role of science or downplay the whole notion. 
60 Godfrey-Smith, op. cit. in 52, p. 192. 
 CL has a straightforward application to laws that are formulated such that they express 
sufficient conditions for something to occur. Extending the model to probabilistically 
formulated laws is explained in bit more detail later, but the problems it presents for CL 
are shown nicely in Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, pp. 51-52 and ch. 5.  
61 Carnap, R., The Value of Laws, in Curd, M., Cover, J. (eds.), Philosophy of Science: 
The Central Issues, Norton, 1998, p. 682. 
62  One symptom that something like this could be at play seems to be that both 
explanations and causation are asymmetric. Explanations, just like causation, don’t seem 
to work in both directions. That is, if an event a causes an event b, then b doesn’t cause 
a. Similarly, if a explains b, it’s not the case that b explains a. arguably, the same works 
for imputation. If an event b is imputed to a, a is not imputed to b.  
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which occur when empiricism about laws and CL are combined. I want to 
focus on only some of them which I think are most interesting for our 
present purposes. I’m under no illusion that this brief overview has the 
force of an argument against sophisticated empiricist positions, but my 
point is to show how Kelsen escapes them. 
When CL is based on an empiricist view of scientific laws, which are just 
generalizations of facts actually existing in this world, it follows that 
generalizations of facts are used to explain those same facts. This just 
seems to turn explanation into a completely trivial activity, similar to 
saying that “A” is explained by “A and B” being true.63 Additionally, the 
same way laws can be invoked to “explain” particular facts, those same 
particular facts can be invoked to “explain” laws as laws just are 
summaries of them.64  And finally, laws explain because they provide 
understanding that if something had been different, something else would 
have as well – they support their counterfactual statements. This involves 
reference to non-actual scenarios which just, by definition, aren’t captured 
by universal generalizations about things which are true in actual world. In 
other words, laws explain precisely because they seem to tell us that some 
things are related in virtue of something more than just brute regularity. 
This whole class of objections can be stated simply. It’s hard to see how 
something generated simply out of facts that have actually occurred can be 
explanatory for those same facts, or predictive about facts that haven’t 
occurred.  
At this point, the already mentioned idea of nomic necessity comes into 
play.65 The general idea is based on this thought that laws can explain 
precisely if they go beyond what actually happened, and state not only how 
things are, but how they must be. Obviously, making sense of this without 
 
63 All of the following points are variations of those raised by Dretske, F., Laws of Nature, 
in Curd, M., Cover, J. (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton, 1998, 
pp. 837-838. 
64 Again, the problem is that explanation seems to be an asymmetric relationship. Given 
that causation seems to be an asymmetric relationship as well it's natural to think that 
explanatory relations must be based on causal relations, broadly understood. It's to be 
noted that CL isn't necessarily based on causal relationships. Laws of nature in that model 
do not purport to be expressions of some hidden causal structures. Il get back to this topic 
in 3.3. 
65 Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, p. 62 
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descending into metaphysical occultism is not an easy task, but we can see 
now how Kelsen could do it.66 
I’ve already hinted at some important features of Kelsen’s understanding 
of natural science, so putting the pieces together, we arrive at the following 
picture. He accepts the view of scientific explanation that weds it to the 
idea of scientific laws.67 Obviously, Kelsen needs to be careful not to draw 
on CL too strongly, because his view of legal science, by definition, is not 
involved in producing testable hypotheses. He needs to take a different 
route, so the appeal for Kelsen might be motivated by his goal to use legal 
science as a way to indirectly apply logic to norms.68 Just as scientific laws 
are used in natural science to deduce knowledge of particular facts, 
propositions of law are used to deduce knowledge of what is “ought” in 
particular situations. 69  The project of legal science would then be to 
formulate legal statements such that their conditions are sufficient for the 
consequent to occur, in parallel to what we have said about scientific 
laws.70 The problem raised by empiricist views of causation is evaded as 
in his early works Kelsen has no trouble ascribing necessity to both 
causation and imputation, and understandably so, given the Kantian thread 
of it. Finally, the answer to our original question is this. Assuming we have 
knowledge of norms, which Kelsen doesn’t consider to be a troublesome 
notion, the piggybacking manoeuvre occurs because imputation mirrors 
laws of nature as tools for deducing knowledge in particular cases.  
 
66 E.g. Fred Dretske's solution is that if laws exist, they have to be relations among 
properties, abstract entities, and not relations among particulars. They hold among 
properties throughout different possible worlds, regardless of the extension of those 
properties in a particular possible world. Dretske, op.cit. in 63, p. 841.  
67 Historically, proponents of CL hold that scientific explanations must invoke laws even 
in history and sociology. Now, it's very doubtful whether the two disciplines really do 
have laws, especially ones satisfying the good grounds condition which might lead to one 
denying their scientific status or adopting a different theory of explanation. 
68 He expresses this idea clearly in Klesen, op. cit. in 3, p. 74. 
69 We could even relate a theme from the previous section with objections to “laws-as-
regularities” view. There’s no hope to reduce legal science to, e.g. just what particular 
legal decisions by the courts are, because knowledge of these particulars cannot explain 
or give us knowledge about what is “ought” in some other particular cases, at least not 
without an imputative link. 
70 I mention as an interesting side note that the problem for CL that is presented by 
probabilistic laws is mirrored by (arguable) existence of defeasible norms, open to an 
indeterminate list of exceptions.. Kelsen doesn't think either presents the problem, as he 
doesn't seem to think that norms can be strongly defeasible. 
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So far I have talked about nomic necessity of laws and (Kantian) necessity 
that Kelsen ascribes to causality and imputation as if the two are closely 
linked. This might be deemed a mistake by some and surely, to think these 
are exactly the same would simply be a silly equivocation. Proponents of 
nomic necessity of laws of nature usually think of this trait as being an 
objective, real feature of the world, whereas an important Kantian premise 
is that empiricists were right in rejecting such claims as empty 
metaphysical speculation. 71  While this much is true, it’s ultimately 
irrelevant where this necessity comes from. It seems that, prima facie at 
least, both notions can do the work required in answering why some 
descriptions are explanatory and others not.  
 To sum up, scientific laws and imputation are explanatory because they 
are, in some sense, necessary. What makes legal science worthy of the 
name science is that it, just like natural science, describes necessary links, 
which allows for generating further knowledge about particulars.  
That’s it for now about the structure. When it comes to relata of the two 
relations, generally one of the issues in philosophy of causation is their 
number. In other words, the question is how many distinct roles are there 
in an expression of causal and imputative relations with the view that there 
are two relata being somewhat of a default position.72 In addition, question 
whether the relata are events, facts, propositions or something else, might 
be posed. It’s then a separate question of how many of these individual 
entities fulfil a particular role of relata.  
Kelsen’s answers to these issues are rarely very explicit and thus I will 
mostly concentrate on what is clear. In the first edition of Pure Theory of 
Law, he endorses exactly the aforementioned default position. Both the 
causation and imputation are presented as linking two entities, “material 
facts” as Kelsen dubs them, which play the roles of cause and effect in the 
 
71 For Kant, necessity of laws of nature points to their apriori nature, whereas nomic 
necessity in the modern sense is presumably a piece of aposteriori knowledge. Despite 
this latter claim seeming odd at first, the idea that there are necessities („metaphysical 
necessities“) which are described by science gained traction in the last century. 
Theoretical identifications such as „Water is H2O“ is a classic example of such 
supposedly aposteriori necessities.  
72 Just to give a glimpse into the alternatives, one might mention the so called “contrastive 
explanation”. On this view causal relations have the form: a causes b rather than c, where 
c has a role of “effectual difference”. See Van Fraassen, B., The Scientific Image, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1980. 
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case of causation and legal condition and legal consequence in the case of 
imputation.73 We’ve already seen an example of causal relationship, so the 
following quote will shine some light on what are material facts in 
imputative relationships:  
“[…] the legal consequence is linked by imputation to the legal condition. 
This is what it means to say that someone is punished because of a delict, 
that a lien against someone’s property is executed because of an unpaid 
debt.”74 
That is, legal consequences of imputative relations are sanctions, as 
commonly understood, while legal conditions are unlawful acts.75 Relata 
of both relationships seems to fall into a broad category of events or states 
of affairs. In his work, Kelsen puts special attention to human behaviour 
as an instance of these material facts. As we’ve seen, Kelsen has no trouble 
admitting the possibility of “causal” social sciences, those describing 
human behaviour in statements of causal laws. That is, it’s perfectly 
possible for human behaviour to be relata of causal relations.76 At first it 
may seem that imputative relations will link human behaviour exclusively, 
but Kelsen explicitly denies this. To recall the intro briefly, this would be 
the traditional view of imputation, which imputes sanction to a person. On 
the other hand Kelsenian imputation imputes a sanction, which must 
always be a human behaviour, to any event whatsoever.77 This isn’t so 
surprising as, after all, imputative links are established by fiat of legal 
authority. 
 
3.3. Later works and changing views 
In the introduction, I have said that there’s a gradual shift from the first to 
the second phase in Kelsen’s work. This change, marked by the weakening 
 
73 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 23.  
74 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 24. 
75 There's a related and complicated issue here. It's widely thought that Kelsen understood 
all norms to be directions to officials to impose sanctions. All other legal modalities, such 
as obligation etc., are just constructed out of this. Paulson nicely presents how Kelsen's 
views have changed on this topic throughout his career as well as the many complexities 
of this simple picture. Paulson, op. cit in 9, section E.  
76 Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 85. 
77 Ibid., p. 100. 
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of Kantian influences, occurs between the first and second edition of the 
Pure Theory of Law. By the second edition, the Kantian influence isn’t so 
much gone as it is treated as a trivial trinket to the whole theory. Cognition 
of legal norms is still taken as a “given”, but the explicit reference to the 
deductive machinery of transcendental arguments is dropped. Perhaps it’s 
tempting to describe this as a shift to Humeanism, and I do think this is 
roughly true. But it’s even more the case that Humeanism gets a treatment 
similar to Kant, as both are mentioned somewhat superficially and almost 
interchangeably.78 
An important motivation for this shift must’ve been his sociological 
inquiry into causation, culminating in his Retribution and Causality.79 The 
crux of this line in Kelsen’s work is that our modern conception of 
causality historically evolved from primitive views which do not see nature 
as a casual order, but anthropomorphically, according to the principle of 
retribution. This principle relates what we today consider causes and 
effects in such a way that causes are considered guilty or responsible for 
the effects, which in turn, depending on whether they are harmful or 
beneficial, are rewards or punishments. So, causal and normative 
interpretations of nature are both possible, and former has historically 
evolved from the latter.80  
 This line of work, for our purposes at least, has the following main 
implication. Not only is causation, contra Kant, not a necessary category 
of our thought, but as a matter of historical fact it can be demonstrated that 
humans did not always think in causal terms. 81  Moreover, given that 
Kelsen embraces Humean rejection of necessity of causation as an 
objective link between things in the world, this somewhat 
straightforwardly turns Kelsen into a Humean about causation. So, while 
both imputation and causation are still described as a “functional 
 
78 Let me once again use the following quote from the second edition to illustrate this 
point. „Imputation, just like causation, is a principle of order in human thinking, and 
therefore just as much or just as little an illusion or ideology as causality, which – to use 
Hume's or Kant's words – is only a thinking habit or category of thinking.“ Kelsen, op. 
cit. in 3, p. 103. 
79 With some anthropological overtones, as he cites works into various different tribal 
people. See Kelsen, op. cit. in 4. 
80 A brief statement of this can be found in Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, pp. 82.-85. 
81 Kelsen, op. cit. in 4, p. 358 
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connection”, Kelsen drops the description of them as necessary.82 In the 
essay Causality and imputation, one other difference between the two 
becomes prominent, namely that imputative relations have definite 
conditions, fulfilment of which requires the consequence ought to take 
place, whereas causality is always a statistical relation, meaning that even 
if the cause takes place, the effect may be absent.83 This is an interesting 
development because, historically, probabilistic formulations presented a 
problem for the CL model, as after all, probabilistic laws don’t always 
seem to be good predictions, despite being good explanations.84  Now, 
Kelsen gives us no reason to think such laws present any kind of problem 
for his views on scientific explanations, despite it historically being an 
important reason for philosophers to shift focus from formulations of laws 
to causal links more directly.  
Let’s now take stock to see where this leaves us. Equating law-likeness of 
imputation to causation seems to assume that laws have some sort of 
explanatory power. I have speculated in the last section that this must be 
due to both of them being, in some sense, necessary and that in both cases 
this necessity was argued for using Kantian-style arguments. It’s not really 
clear where we are left. Obviously, while causation isn’t a necessary 
relation, imputation might still be. This would imply that whatever justifies 
imputation and whatever justifies scientific laws differs, making the whole 
 
82 Kelsen, op. cit. in 2, p. 103. A clarification of Kelsen’s terminology is important. 
“Necessity” is often used by Kelsen to mean non-statistical. My use of the term differs 
from this and was hopefully somewhat made clear in the previous section. So, not only 
does Kelsen deny that causality is necessary in his sense due to being statistical, his 
acceptance of Humeanism and rejection of Kant’s arguments imply the rejection of 
causality as necessary in my sense.  
83 Statistical nature of all laws of nature is something Kelsen argues for at length in 
Retribution and Causality, mostly basing his arguments on irreducible probability of 
quantum mechanics. Kelsen, op. cit. in 4, pp. 362.-366. 
84Let's just to develop this point slightly. The fact that a person has cancer is explained by 
the fact that they smoke, but the fact that one is a smoker does not give you good grounds 
to expect that they will have lung cancer, as they likely will not. A proponent of CL might 
try to respond to this example by requiring that a law linking smoking and cancer would 
also have to include statements about the requisite genetic makeup or some environmental 
factors that, when combined with smoking, tell us when the probability of lung cancer 
reaches 1, and thus give good grounds to expect a person to have lung cancer. While this 
might help in this case, as Kelsen himself points out, some laws of nature seem to be 
irreducibly probabilistic. The most famous example might be the second law of 
thermodynamics, stating that the entropy of a closed system will probably increase over 
time. See Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, pp. 101-102.  
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manoeuvre just a rhetorical trick. This isn’t a satisfactory solution, so we 
might want to reinterpret our previous analysis on what makes scientific 
laws explanatory. This, on the other hand, will not be an easy task as 
denying nomic necessity of laws in considered biting the bullet.85 So, it’s 
seemingly a positive development that in his final work, General Theory 
of Norms, both relations are again described as necessary,86 but let me just 
briefly delve into why this optimism is premature.  
General Theory of Norms drops the Kantian apparatus of transcendental 
deduction and presuppositions and adopts the views of German fictionalist 
philosopher Hans Vaihinger. Vaihinger’s basic thought, built on advances 
in evolutionary science, is that what is selected for in the evolution of our 
cognitive capacities is the ability to aid us in carrying out activities that are 
useful for the purposes of survival.87 For the bare purposes of carrying out 
those actions necessary for survival our intellect doesn’t need to be a fully 
reliable guide on how the world is so ultimately our guiding cognitive aim 
is the prediction and control of empirical phenomena, not correspondence 
to objective reality. This is why fictions, theoretical claims known to be 
untrue, may have an indispensable role to play here, provided they allows 
us to arrive to useful predictions. Our total theoretic image of the world is 
ultimately limited by those fictions that have been preserved as most 
adaptive for our basic practical aims. The upshot is that for Vaihinger, 
science rests heavily on practical output and testability. The problem might 
be clear now, because it’s the one we warned against in the discussion 
about CL. By substituting Kantian presuppositions with fictions, Kelsen 
might have adopted a view of science that’s too reliant on prediction and 
testing.88  
 
85 Rosenberg goes so far to say that those who deny it „have no resources for illuminating 
the indispensibility of laws in scientific explanation.“ Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, p. 75. 
86 Kelsen, op. cit. in 6, p. 22. 
87  The source for Vaihinger's views is Stoll, T., "Hans Vaihinger", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/vaihinger/>. 
88 Kelsen explicitly adopts a view that he no longer thinks of Basic Norms as being 
presuppositions, but Vaihingerian fictions. Kelsen, op. cit. in 6, p. 256. 
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Finally, let’s point out two structural features of imputation and causation 
that Kelsen starts highlighting in his later works. Firstly, causation has an 
infinite chain structure, whereas imputation does not.89  
As Kelsen puts it:  
“…every concrete cause has to be considered as the effect of some other 
cause, and every concrete effect as the cause of some other effect, and so—
by the very nature of causality—the chain of cause and effect is endless in 
both directions.90 In the case of imputation, the situation is completely 
different. The condition to which a sanction is imputed […] is not 
necessarily a consequence which has to be imputed to some other 
condition. And the consequences […] need not necessarily be conditions 
to which further consequences are imputed. […]. If we say that a certain 
consequence is imputed to a certain condition […] then the condition […] 
is the endpoint of imputation.”91 
Prima facie, this might seem to contradict the previously stated 
characterisation of causality as a link between two elements, so a 
clarification is in order.92 While the overall chain of causality is infinite, 
 
89 This particular difference has an important additional role for him. In Causality and 
Imputation and the second edition of Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen explores whether the 
infinite chain structure of causality can be squared together with freedom of will and 
retributive imposition of sanctions. 
90 Kelsen almost derisively talks about the idea that there is a God-induced first cause of 
some kind, claiming that such thinking can only be explained as primitive thinking and a 
lingering reference to principle of retribution. Kelsen, op. cit. in 3, p. 91. 
91 Kelsen, op. cit. in 6, pp. 24-25. One might wonder whether this is consistent with 
another Kelsen’s doctrine, that of “legal completeness” or legal “closure”. The doctrine, 
roughly put, states that law provides solution to every problem, or that every event is 
legally qualified in some way. Consequently, if every event is legally qualified in some 
way, then then consequences imputed to some conditions are, contrary to Kelsen’s claim, 
conditions for some further consequences. The doctrine of legal completeness is one of 
the cornerstones of Kelsen’s view of law in the Pure Theory of Law. I take Kelsen to 
maintain the crux of the doctrine even in General Theory of Norms, despite his somewhat 
cryptic remarks about it, namely that “behaviour which is not determined by any legal 
norm is subject to the legal order – potentially if not actually.” See Kelsen, op. cit. in 6, 
p. 148. 
92 Kelsen's remarks easily add to the confusion. In Retribution and Causality, he explicitly 
denies that causality has only „two links“, insisting that the chain of causality is infinite. 
Later, in General Theory of Norms, he maintains, in the same paragraph, that causality 
links „two material facts“, but also that it doesn't have only „two links“ and is infinite in 
both directions.  
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each particular link can be expressed by a hypothetical judgement 
containing two parts, in roles of a cause and an effect. This is consistent 
with Kelsen’s claims that “no event depends on a single cause” because 
despite the plurality of necessary conditions for something to occur, they 
all play the role of “cause” in hypothetical judgements.93 
The second feature is exactly this last point. Kelsen considers all the 
necessary conditions for something to occur are to be considered as causes, 
so he doesn’t distinguish between causes of a certain event, the “main 
triggers” of it and some sort of “backgrounds conditions”.94 I mention this 
structural feature because it’s interesting in its own right, but also to relate 
it to one other view in philosophy of science. Historically, some 
philosophers have felt scepticism towards the view that scientific laws are 
such a fundamental part of scientific explanations. This is related to the 
already mentioned problems of probabilistic laws but also to problems of 
extending CL to special sciences. In the end, if we want to make sense of 
explanations in sociology and history, some other theory might be 
necessary. One attempt of this kind involves divorcing causation from laws 
of nature and recasting explanation so that it involves descriptions of 
causes, but not necessarily laws of nature. This might be familiar from 
history. We say that one of the causes of German defeat in the Eastern front 
during World War II is the fact that they were caught up by winter. This 
seems to be an explanatory statement, but there’s no reference to laws here 
or pretence that this is the only necessary condition that brought about the 
German defeat.95 It’s interesting to note how Kelsen precludes himself 
from adopting some version of this view because this type of explanation 
requires a somewhat robust distinction between potentially infinite number 
of necessary conditions for something to occur, and the subset of them that 
we call “causes” and which do the explanatory work. The views that do 
this often ground this distinction in the context of an inquiry making what 
 
93 Kelsen, op. cit. in 4, p. 359. 
94 Views that do discriminate between these draw on the fact that, e.g. the event of the 
universe coming to be some time ago seems to be a background condition for Annie’s 
breaking of the window yesterday, but it isn’t a cause of it. Something like this is 
occasionally mirrored in legal science when there’s an attempt to draw the difference 
among all the conditions necessary for some legal consequence to come about. See, e.g. 
Klarić, P., Vedriš, M., Građansko pravo, Narodne Novine, Zagreb, 2014, pp. 26-29.  
95 The famous “If you invade Russia in winter, you will lose.” is only mockingly called 
the law of history. 
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counts as a cause (and explanation) context-relative, and not an objective 
relation.96  
It seems that causality and imputation share this feature. As I said, on 
Kelsen’s views, legal norms would have to be formulated such that they 
include all the necessary conditions for the consequence to be “triggered”. 
The problem of norm-individuation is a difficult one97 but if, analogous to 
causality, there’s no distinguishing between different types of legal 
conditions, I cannot help but wonder whether there’s a missed opportunity 
for legal science. After all, as a matter of how legal science actually 
formulates norms or explains particular facts, this doesn’t seem right. After 
all, legal science rarely, if ever, individuates norms such that they include 
all the spatiotemporal conditions necessary for their application, and the 
legal conditions are usually just some more immediate ones.98 A view of 
explanation that accounts for this feature of legal science would be 
interesting, but it doesn’t seem to be the one that Kelsen endorses.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This was, by all accounts, a whirlwind treatment of a wide array of difficult 
topics, so let me conclude with some brief remarks and summaries. It 
would be a mistake to think that anything in this work aims to undermine 
the legitimacy of legal science. I completely follow Kelsen in thinking that 
dogmatic jurisprudence has a positive status of some kind and cannot be 
replaced by any sort of naturalised versions of it. No “norm-sceptic” will 
be convinced by section 2 and Kelsen’s arguments presented in them, and 
this was not the point. Interesting as debating a sceptic may be, sometimes 
philosophy just needs to assume that there’s a good answer to him or that 
 
96 Rosenberg, op. cit. in 37, p. 84. 
97 Raz, J., The Concept of a Legal System, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, pp. 70-92.  
98  Let's illustrate this with just one example. Criminal procedure jurisprudence will 
identify conditions for arrest and detention as some formal requirments (written warrant) 
and material requirements (certain level of doubt and causae arresti). Quite clearly, some 
other unstated requirements need to occur as well, regarding even the applicability of 
national law to the case, formal procedural requirements, etc. See Krapac, D., Kazneno 
procesno pravo; Prva knjiga: Institucije, Narodne Novine, Zagreb, 2015, pp. 381-393. 
Now, context-sensitive theory of explanation will claim that in certain context, exactly 
these „background“ requirements will be those that are more important in our explanation, 
and not the more immediate ones.  
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common sense is true to proceed to tell something interesting that builds 
on it. A good part of this work aimed at exploring something like that, 
namely the doctrine of imputation, and trying to make sense of Kelsen’s 
attempt to show legal science and natural science to be fundamentally 
alike. The conclusion was that it makes most sense if we make the most 
work out of the idea of nomic necessity, as it is a relatively uncontroversial 
notion in philosophy of science. In the latter part, we saw how Kelsen 
seems to fail on his own terms in answering what’s the point of his 
interesting “piggybacking” manoeuvre. So this, seeing whether Kelsen’s 
move makes sense on its own terms, is what we mostly confined ourselves 
to. We didn’t go very deep into a discussion whether the terms themselves 
make sense, aside from this brief glimpse at the end, which might be an 
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Rad se bavi pojmom perifernog pripisivanja iz teorije Hansa Kelsena, 
odnosom kojeg pravo uspostavlja između pravnog uvjeta i posljedice kao 
materijalnih činjenica. Kao temeljni pojam pravne znanosti, Kelsen ga 
opisuje kroz usporedbu s uzročnošću, temeljnim načelom prirodnih 
znanosti koje također, iako na drukčiji način, povezuje materijalne 
činjenice. Osim prikaza same usporedbe, u radu se obrađuje način na koji 
Kelsen koristi usporedbu dva odnosa u prilog pravne znanosti. Prvo, 
njihova se razlika koristi da se motivira potreba za autonomijom pravne 
znanosti. Ako ima smisla reći da su stvari povezane na način koji nije 
uzročni odnos, ima smisla reći da postoji potreba za znanošću koja opisuje 
stvari kroz prizmu tog odnosa. Drugo, isticanjem se sličnosti između 
pripisivanja i uzročnosti te posljedično pravne i prirodne znanosti, 
pokušava uzdići znanstveni ugled one prve. Budući da su, u Kelsenovim 
djelima, odnosi uzročnosti zapravo znanstveni zakoni, istraživanje ovog 
drugog Kelsenovog poteza zahtjeva objašnjenje što točno čini znanstvene 
zakona tako važnima u znanstvenom objašnjavanju i može li se isto 
preslikati na odnos imputacije. Odgovor na ovo nije sasvim očit, no rad 
oprezno predlaže da bi se Kelsen mogao poslužiti idejom nomičke nužnosti 
zakona, budući da Kelsen, u ranijim radovima barem, oba odnosa opisuje 
kao nužne. Kada u kasnijim radovima Kelsen odstupi od ove 
karakterizacije, postavlja se pitanje može li cijeli manevar uopće opstati.    
Ključne riječi: Kelsen, pripisivanje, pravna znanost, uzročnost.
